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Recent Cases
Defendants' method of distributing
mailings and statements in their
mailings describing their distribu-
tion methods.
To be an unlawful business
practice, the challenged action must
be: (1) illegal; and (2) a business
practice. Because Plaintiff failed to
show that the distribution method
was illegal under the lottery statute,
the court granted summary judgment
to Defendants.
The court also granted summary
judgment to Defendants on the
second element of the distribution
count, the allegedly illegal state-
ments. The court found that the
sweepstakes' representations that
"'No Purchase Is Necessary' to win"
were not misleading or false, since
Plaintiff provided no evidence that
these statements were not true.
Pre-Selected Winning
Numbers Did Not Mislead
Customers
Plaintiff claimed that certain
publishers' statements regarding the
use of pre-selected winning numbers
also constituted misleading and false
advertising. These statements
referred to the dates of AFP's and
PCH's prize drawings and the
chances of winning the contests.
Plaintiff argued that since these
Defendants use pre-selected winning
numbers, they misrepresented how
often they held the drawings for
prizes. The court found, however,
that Defendants truthfully stated the
frequency of their prize drawings in
their mailings.
Additionally, Plaintiff claimed
that entries received earlier by the
publishers had a greater chance of
being the winning entry based on the
pre-selected entry scheme. Plaintiff,
however, failed to clearly explain
this theory to the court. Conse-
quently, the court granted summary
judgment to Defendants.
Defendants' Change in
Rules Did Not Mislead
Consumers
Finally, Plaintiff challenged an
alleged change in the prizes and
rules of a sweepstakes run by AFP.
AFP's Sweepstakes #27 changed six
$1 million prizes to one $10 million
prize. Plaintiff also claimed that an
AFP rule change appeared in some
mailings, but was omitted in others,
constituting false and misleading
statements. The court granted AFP
summary judgment on both of these
counts, finding that AFP's rules
authorized AFP to change prizes,
therefore no evidence supported
Plaintiff's argument that this rule
change misled consumers. The court
granted summary judgment due to
the insufficiency of Plaintiff's
evidence, the unlikelihood of
Defendants' statements misleading a
reasonable customer, and a plain-
reading of Defendants' sweepstakes
bulletins.
Thus, except for Plaintiff's
claims against AFP's prompt-pay
sweepstakes, the court granted
summary judgment to Defendants
on all of Plaintiff's claims since they
were not supported by law or
evidence. Although it denied
summary judgment to AFP on the
issue of whether AFP's prompt-pay
sweepstakes required illegal
consideration, the court found that
all of the other challenged sweep-
stakes were not illegal under
California criminal law. Addition-
ally, the court did not find any of
Defendants' sweepstakes advertising
or statements regarding their
methods of running the sweepstakes
false or misleading.
Virginia Consumer Protection Statutes Fail to
Protect Business in its Capacity as a Competitor
By Philip Tortorich
Deceit, fraud and misrepresenta-
tion - these are the problems that
states seek to combat with consumer
protection laws. While the state laws
do not use the same wording, the
main focus of all of these laws is to
protect consumers from dishonest
suppliers. Courts have had to answer
an ancillary issue concerning
whether a supplier of goods has
standing to sue its competitor under
these consumer protection laws. In
H.D. Oliver Funeral Apartments,
Inc. v. Dignity Funeral Services,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Va.
1997), a district court addressed this
issue and held that a supplier did not
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have standing to sue its competitor
under a Virginia consumer protec-
tion act.
H.D. Oliver Funeral Apartments
("Oliver") and Dignity Funeral
Services, trading as Altmeyer
Funeral Homes, Inc. ("Altmeyer"),
were in the business of providing a
full range of funeral services to
customers in Virginia and nearby
states. In January of 1997, Altmeyer
advertised its services in a newspa-
per circulating in Virginia and North
Carolina. The ad compared prices of
Altmeyer with thirteen other
competing funeral homes, including
Oliver. Altmeyer also compared total
prices among funeral homes. The
problem with the ad was not the fact
that the comparisons were made but
that the prices listed for all of the
companies were knowingly false
and misleading. Oliver initiated this
suit claiming that the ad violated
two state statutes: the Comparison
Price Advertisement Act, VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-207.40 (Michie 1992),
and the Virginia Consumer Protec-
tion Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-196
(Michie 1992).
Virginia Enacts Consumer
Protection Statutes
In 1992, Virginia enacted the
Comparison Price Advertisement
Act ("CPAA"). The relevant portion
of the CPAA states: "no supplier
shall in any manner knowingly
advertise a comparison price which
is based on another supplier's price
unless: ... [t]he supplier can
substantiate that the comparison
price is the price offered for sale by
another supplier." Both Oliver and
Altmeyer are suppliers under the
CPAA. Under the statute, violations
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of the CPAA are also violations of
the Virginia Consumer Protection
Act ("VCPA").
In 1977, Virginia enacted the
VCPA, intending it to be "applied as
remedial legislation to promote fair
and ethical standards of dealings
between suppliers and the consum-
ing public." The VCPA prohibits
more than thirty specific practices,
two of which are relevant to this
case. First, it prohibits suppliers
from violating the CPAA. Second, it
prohibits suppliers from: "[ulsing
any.., deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, or misrepre-
sentation in connection with a
consumer transaction," (emphasis
added). A consumer transaction,
under the statute, includes four types
of dealings. The one at issue in this
case is "the advertisement, sale,
lease or offering for sale or lease, of
goods or services to be used
primarily for personal, family or
household purposes[.]" Willful
violators of the VCPA may be liable
for three times the amount of actual
damages, attorney fees, and costs.
Altmeyer Contended Oliver
Had No Standing to Sue
Under the CPAA and VCPA
Oliver's complaint contained
many counts. This appeal only dealt
with Oliver's second count which
alleged that Altmeyer violated the
CPAA and the VCPA. Altmeyer
moved to dismiss this count on the
grounds that Oliver did not have
standing to sue under the Acts
because Oliver was not a consumer.
Specifically, Altmeyer argued that
the statutes only protect consumers
from suppliers, and Oliver was not a
consumer; rather, Oliver was a
competitor. Altmeyer contended that
the only persons who can make
claims under the VCPA are those
who have suffered a loss in a
consumer transaction. Altmeyer
argued that Oliver had not suffered
loss as a result of a consumer
transaction but rather as a business
competitor - a loss not covered
under the VCPA - and therefore
had no standing to sue.
Oliver, on the other hand, argued
that the scope of the VCPA is broad
enough to protect competitors since
the statute's only limitation on who
may recover is "any person who
suffered a loss as a result of a
violation" and "person" includes a
corporation under the statute.
Further, Oliver argued that the
Virginia legislature did not limit the
scope of the VCPA to consumers
only, and if it had wanted to limit the
scope, it could have done so as it did
in other consumer protection acts.
Finally, Oliver argued that allowing
non-consumers to sue under the
VCPA would further the legislative
intent of applying the VCPA as
remedial legislation.
Whether a competitor is pro-
tected under the Virginia statutes
had never been addressed in the
federal courts or the Virginia
appellate courts. The court noted
that in ruling on a case without
federal precedent, a federal court is
permitted to look at decisions of
state trial courts. Further, where
private parties raise "unsettled
questions of state law which involve
- apart from normal precedential
effect - only the rights of these
private parties," a federal court may
properly rule on this issue even
though the federal decision may not
coincide with a later state decision.
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Court Rejected Parties'
Comparison to Other States'
Consumer Protection Laws
Altmeyer and Oliver both argued
that the court should look to cases
interpreting other states' consumer
protection laws as a guide for
determining whether a competitor
has standing to sue under the
Virginia laws. For instance,
Altmeyer argued that the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act supported
the claim that competitors could not
sue under an act similar to the
Virginia law. Specifically, Altmeyer
argued that the
court in
Coyler v. Trew, Oliver t
1982 WL
4419, *4 compe
(Tenn. Ct. c
App. Feb. 12, standii
1982), held
that a competi- VCPA si
tor did not
have standing havc
to sue a
competitor for ci
its false
advertising.
The court in the instant case found a
major difference between the
Tennessee Act and the VCPA. The
Tennessee Act specifically states
that only consumers may recover
under the statute. The same is not
true under the VCPA; the VCPA
language is open to interpretation.
Therefore, the court in the instant
case found the Tennessee court's
holding inapplicable.
Altmeyer also tried to analogize
to a Florida Act which is similar to
the VCPA. However, in the Florida
Act, a consumer transaction is
defined differently. A consumer
transaction in Florida is "a sale...
or other disposition of an item, a
consumer service, or an intangible to
an individual for purposes that are
primarily personal, family or
household," (emphasis added). This
statutory language prevents a
corporation from suing because it is
not "an individual." Unlike the
Florida Act, a corporation is allowed
to sue under the VCPA provided that
the business is involved in a
consumer transaction. Accordingly,
the court in the instant case rejected
Altmeyer's comparison to the
Florida Act.
ried to persuade the cour
titors in Virginia should
ng to sue for a violation o
ince competitors in other
this right under analogc
onsumer protection acts.
Finally, Altmeyer attempted to
use the Pennsylvania Consumer
Protection Act to show that competi-
tors do not have standing to sue.
Under the Pennsylvania Act,
recovery is allowed by "any person
who purchases or leases goods or
services primarily for personal,
family or household purposes." This
language differs from the VCPA
because the VCPA allows recovery
by any person injured by the act.
Also, the Pennsylvania Act defines
consumer transactions differently
than the VCPA. Accordingly, the
court in the instant case held that the
Pennsylvania Act was "not support-
ive of the proposition that under the
VCPA a business entity may not sue
a competitor for false advertising."
Like Altmeyer, Oliver also
attempted to analogize to other state
acts. Oliver tried to persuade the
court that competitors in Virginia
should have standing to sue for a
violation of the VCPA since com-
petitors in other states have this right
under analogous consumer protec-
tion acts. For example, Oliver
looked to the Delaware Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practice Act. Oliver
argued that the court in Roberts v.
American War-
ranty Corp., 514
t that A.2d 1132, 1132(Del. Super. Ct.
have 1986), allowed
competitors to sue
f the under the Dela-
ware Act, and
states therefore, com-
petitors in
)us Virginia should
also have standing
to sue. The court
in the instant case
rejected this
analysis because it found that the
real issue in Roberts was whether a
consumer - not a competitor -
had standing to sue under that
statute, and the instant case only
concerned a competitor. Further-
more, because the Roberts court
made little mention of the specific
wording of the Delaware Act in its
opinion, the court in the instant case
found it difficult to compare the
Delaware Act effectively with the
VCPA.
Oliver then tried to analogize to
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act to
Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 3231997
support its proposition that competi-
tors have standing to sue. However,
the Illinois Act specifically provides
for a right of recovery by "any
person who suffers damages in
violation of the Act committed by
any other person." As in the VCPA,
the term "person" is defined in the
Illinois Act to include corporations.
However, the Illinois Act was
specifically designed to "protect
consumers and borrowers and
businessmen against fraud, unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce."
This language made it clear to the
court that a competitor in Illinois has
standing to sue. Since the Virginia
legislature did not state that its
intention was to include business
protection in the VCPA, the court in
the instant case held that the Illinois
Act was no help in interpreting the
VCPA.
Finally, Oliver tried to use the
Colorado Consumer Protection Act
to support its contention. Oliver
argued that the court in Heller v.
Lexton-Ancira Real Estate Fund,
Ltd., 809 P.2d 1016, 1022 (Col. Ct.
App. 1990), overruled a previous
ruling that granted limited recovery
only to consumers under the
Colorado Act. The language of the
Colorado Act stated that "the
provisions of this article shall be
available to any person in a civil
action for any claim against any
person who has engaged in or
caused another to engage in any
deceptive trade practice," (emphasis
added). Oliver argued that the "any
person" language included competi-
tors. The court in the instant case
acknowledged that, generally, the
Colorado Act supported Oliver's
argument. Nonetheless, the court
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found that the Colorado Act still did
not help the court decipher the
language of the VCPA because the
language of the two acts varied
significantly.
VCPA Does Not Protect
Competitors
In dismissing the analogies to the
other state consumer protection
statutes, the court in this case held
that the issue of standing depended
on the specific language of the
Virginia Acts. In general, there are
two types of state consumer protec-
tion laws. One type limits recovery
only to consumers who purchase
products "primarily for personal,
family or household purposes."
Under this construction, businesses
do not have standing to sue. The
other type of consumer protection
law allows recovery by "any injured
person." This latter construction
permits businesses to sue if they are
acting in a consumer capacity. The
court included the VCPA in the
second type of consumer protection
laws because businesses may sue
under the statute.
Even though the court found that
the Virginia statute fell within this
second category of consumer
protection statutes, the court held
that Oliver did not have standing to
sue because Altmeyer was not acting
in a "consumer capacity." In
determining what a "consumer
capacity" was, the court looked to
Virginia law concerning statutory
construction and found that statutes
were to be construed so as to
"promote the ability of the enact-
ment to remedy the mischief at
which it is directed," (citing Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va. v. Harris,
387 S.E.2d 772, 775 (Va. 1990)).
The intent of the VCPA, as stated
in the Act, is to "promote fair and
ethical standards of dealings
between suppliers and the consum-
ing public." Oliver argued that the
Act, as remedial legislation, should
be liberally construed. However, the
law of remedial legislation requires
that remedial legislation be con-
strued liberally, "so as to suppress
the mischief and advance the
remedy in accordance with the
legislature's intended purpose." The
court found that if Oliver could
argue for a liberal construction of
the statute, Oliver could argue that it
had standing to sue. However,
remedial legislation must be viewed
in light of its purported purpose, and
the purpose of the VCPA is to
suppress deceptive practices of
suppliers as they affect the consum-
ing public, not competitors.
Oliver also argued that by
forbidding a competitor to sue under
the VCPA the injured competitor
would be precluded from obtaining
relief. While not deciding the issue,
the court stated that Oliver could be
entitled to sue under certain Virginia
statutes which prohibit businesses
from publishing advertisements that
contain misleading statements.
In sum, the court held that
businesses as competitors do not
have standing to sue under the
VCPA. Therefore, the court ruled
that Altmeyer's motion to dismiss
was proper because Oliver sued as a
competitor, not as a consumer, and
therefore lacked standing under the
Virginia Acts.
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